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We present a quantum protocol for sending a deterministic message by encrypting each classical
bit by two photons and using a quantum key. The protocol has two varieties where the two photons
can be either entangled or non-entangled and requires a one-way quantum channel and a classical
channel. The protocol requires also preprocessing the information before being encoded in the
quantum state of photons in order to prevent an eavesdropper from deciphering parts of the message.
The key to decrypt the message is sent with the same quantum encryption protocol only if no
eavesdropper is detected.
1. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography has become one of the most
fruitful and versatile commercial applications of quantum
information. While classical encryption can in principle
be compromised with a powerful enough computer, quan-
tum encryption provides a platform where any eavesdrop-
ping attempt can be detected with a very high prob-
ability. There are several major schemes where quan-
tum encryption is employed such as quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD) where a random key is generated and
securely shared between two parties ande used later in
classical encryption, quantum secure direct communica-
tion (QSDC) where a certain message is securely and di-
rectly transferred between two parties using a quantum
algorithm without the need for sharing a secure key or
sending data over the classical channel except for detect-
ing an eavesdropper and deterministic secure quantum
communication (DSQC) where the message is also sent
deterministically over a quantum channel with the help
of sending data over the classical channel [1]. There is
also a wide variety of implementations of each of these
schemes in terms of the states of the photons used (en-
tangled photons or single photons) and the type of the
quantum channel (one-way or two-way channel).
The oldest QKD protocol (BB84) was introduced by
Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [2] and uses single pho-
tons. There are other protocols that use entangled pairs
of photons such as the protocol introduced by Eckert [3].
Similarly, there are numerous QSDC schemes that use en-
tangled photons, usually in one of Bell states ([4–6]) and
others which use single photons [7] and DSQC schemes
which use entangled photons [8–10] and others that use
single photons [9, 11–13]. Many QSDC/DSQC proto-
cols require two-way quantum channels where photons
are sent back and forth between Alice and Bob (the two
famous parties who knows the laws of quantum mechan-
ics very well and use them in order to secure their com-
munication). This requires storing the qubits for a long
time which may be difficult to achieve due to their short
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coherence time and requires also controlling the timing
of their manipulation using a quantum memory [14].
QKD can be implemented by sending single photons
using only a single degree of freedom, i.e., using a two-
dimensional Hilbert space, as in BB84 protocol. For
sending data in a deterministic manner, we need at least
a four-dimensional Hilbert space [11, 15]. For example,
in the protocol proposed by A. Beige et. al. [11] both
the spatial and polarization degrees of freedom of single
photons are used. In DSQC/QSDC, we aim, as in QKD,
to detect an eavesdropper (let us call him Evan) with a
very high probability, and also to prevent Evan from dis-
cerning a good part of the message before being detected
[7]. One of the main ideas in this paper is that fulfill-
ing the first aim actually facilitates the fulfillment of the
second one, by sending an encrypted message, and only
sending the key to decrypt this message once the safety
of the communication channel is verified. This can be
done in several ways. For example, we can preprocess
the message before sending it with a DSQC protocol us-
ing a symmetric cryptographic algorithm and send the
crypto-key (using a similar DSQC protocol) only if the
channel is safe. This way, we can ensure that even if
Evan discerned part of the sent packet, he will not be
able to decipher it since the key will not be available to
him. Another simple way to do this is simply to shuffle
the bits constituting the message in a random order and
only send the information used to restore the order of
each bit after ensuring the privacy of the channel.
In this paper, we present a scheme where both the
key and the encrypted message are sent over a quan-
tum channel using pairs of single photons or entangled
photons. The two protocols require a one-way quantum
channel in addition to the classical channel and use a
similar pre- and postprocessing of the transmitted bits
(Fig. 1) but differ in the quantum encryption part (Fig.
2). In section 2, we present the first protocol using un-
entagled photons and describe the classical preprocessing
common in the two protocols. In section 3, we present the
second protocol using entangled photons. We present the
two protocols using generic quantum circuits. Finally, in
section 4, we analyze the error rates caused by a simple
eavesdropping scheme for the two protocols.
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22. DSQC PROTOCOL WITHOUT
ENTANGLEMENT
In this protocol, Alice encodes each bit by two photons
(we will refer to photons as qubits henceforth) encoded in
two different bases assigned to the two qubits randomly.
For general qubits, a Hadamard gate can be inserted to
one of the two qubits selected randomly after being en-
coded in the computational basis with the state of the
classical bit. In the case for photons, these two bases can
be the rectilinear and diagonal polarization. Bob, on the
other hand, measures the two qubits always in the same
basis which can be either one of them randomly for each
pair (see Fig. 2-a, b). By doing this, and assuming a
noiseless channel, he ensures that at least one of the two
qubits will be measured in the correct basis. The mea-
surement outcome of the other qubit will be completely
random. In cases where his measurements of the two
qubits agree, he knows for sure which bit was encoded by
Alice without the need for classical communication. For
the other cases, Bob will send to Alice over the classical
channel the locations of the pairs where his measurement
outcomes are different. Alice, in turn, will send him over
the classical channel her choices for these cases.
So far, we have introduced only the quantum encryp-
tion part of our DSQC protocol. In order to detect eaves-
dropping and ensure that Evan cannot decode any part
of the message before he is detected, more layers of com-
plexity should be added at each level (see Fig. 1). For
example, Alice can insert a random subset of bits (re-
dundancy check bits) into the main message at random
locations and communicate with Bob in public at the
end of transmission her choices for these bits together
with their locations. An eavesdropper intervening in the
middle by doing any kind of measurements will spoil the
encoding of the redundant qubit pairs. Moreover, in or-
der to prevent Evan from detecting any sequence of bits
before being detected, the packet is encrypted with some
sort of symmetric-key encryption algorithms before be-
ing sent to Bob. The key is generated at Alice’s side
and sent to Bob in the same manner at the end of the
encrypted packet transmission only if no eavesdropping
is detected. Consequently, even if Evan could intercept
a few bits of the encrypted message by posing as Bob,
he would not be able to get any useful information from
them without the key used by Alice to encrypt the mes-
sage. In other words, in order for Evan to get any part of
the packet he needs to know both the exact key and the
exact encrypted message without being detected which
is very improbable to happen.
Let us now outline the complete algorithm in detail.
1. Alice divides the full message into small packets
M , and computes a hash value S for each packet,
such as a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) [16] or a
checksum to detect errors in the transmission. Let
us denote each of the new packets resulting after
appending S to M as C.
2. Alice generates a random key K and use it to en-
crypt C by a symmetric key algorithm [17] to ob-
tain a new packet P . We recommend an error cor-
recting code such as [18] in order to overcome errors
due to noisy channels or imperfect photon detec-
tors. Nevertheless, let us assume for the sake of
simplicity that P = K × C.
3. Alice adds a small number of random bits at ran-
dom locations of P as a redundancy check to obtain
a new packet T .
4. Inside the quantum encoder, Alice encodes each bit
of T by two qubits in the |0〉 or |1〉 according to the
classical bit before applying a Hadmard gate to one
of the two qubits selected randomly (see Fig. 2-a).
5. Bob receives each pair of qubits and either applies a
Hadamard gate to the two qubits or not randomly
and records his measurements for each pair, as in
Fig. 2-b.
6. Bob sends to Alice over the classical channel the in-
dices of the pair where his measurements outcomes
agree. These are the bits of T which Bob could
decode independently of Alice.
7. Alice sends to Bob over the classical channel her
choices of the basis for the other pairs. Bob uses
this information to decode the rest of T .
8. Alice sends to Bob the indices of the redundant
bits added to P and they compare their values of
these bits. If the number of discrepancies between
them is higher than a certain threshold determined
by the noise of the channel, they conclude that an
eavesdropper is intercepting the transmission and
the transmission is aborted. Otherwise, they pro-
ceed with the transmission of the key and steps 4-7
are repeated for K.
9. Bob uses K to decrypt T in order to obtain C. He
computes the hash value S and compares it with
the received one. In case of discrepancies, they
conclude that either the channel is too noisy and
the errors have corrupted the message/key or the
whole transmission is compromised.
3. DSQC PROTOCOL WITH ENTANGLEMENT
Here, we introduce a second protocol which is simi-
lar to the one presented in the previous section in terms
of the classical preprocessing, but differs in the quan-
tum encoding stage. In this protocol, we encode every
classical bit by two entangled qubits which are divided
among Alice and Bob. In particular, we encode ‘1’ by
the state 12 (|00〉 − |01〉 − |10〉 − |11〉) and ‘0’ by the state
1
2 (|00〉 − |01〉 + |10〉 + |11〉). These two states can be
generated by the circuit shown in Fig. 2-c with the in-
formation bit controlling a Z-gate [19]. The two states
3are verified to be entangled using the Peres–Horodecki
criterion [20, 21].
Alice sends one of the two qubits to Bob and keeps
the other one. Bob applies a Hadamard gate to his qubit
before measuring it in the computational basis (see Fig.
2-d). The state of the two qubits just before the mea-
surements become the Bell states 1√
2
(|10〉 − |01〉) for ‘1’
and 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉) for ‘0’. When Alice announces in
public the result of her measurement, Bob knows from
his own measurement whether the Z-gate was inserted
or not, i.e., whether ‘1’ or ‘0’ was encoded. An eaves-
dropper tampering with the communication channel will
alter the state of the two qubits and eventually introduce
errors that can be detected using the redundancy check
bits.
4. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Let us imagine a typical eavesdropping scenario and
analyze the bit error rate (BER) caused by it, assuming
that perfect photon detectors are used by all sides. Let
us consider first the quantum encoder without entangle-
ment. A typical strategy Evan can follow is to behave
as Bob by measuring the two qubits in the same basis,
re-encode them, as Alice would do, and send them for-
ward to Bob. This is called intercept-resend-attack. In
this strategy, one of the two qubits (the one correspond-
ing to disagreement between Alice’s and Evan’s choices)
will be certainly disturbed by Evan. Bob, on the other
hand, will measure the two qubits in some basis, which
may be different than Evans’. If their choices agree, their
measurement outcomes will also agree. In this case, re-
gardless whether the measurement outcomes of the two
qubits are the same or not, Evan will be able to know
the classical bit that was encoded after Alice communi-
cates her choices over the classical channel and it will also
cause no errors in the transmitted bit. This scenario will
occur 50% of the time. On the other hand, if the choices
of Evan and Bob disagree (this occurs 50% of the time
as well), the measurement outcomes at Bob’s side will be
completely random, and therefore errors will occur with
a probability 50%, given this scenario. Therefore, the bit
error rate, assuming a noiseless channel, caused by the
intervention of Evan is 25%, similar to the BER of BB84
protocol for the same kind of attack. More complex at-
tack scenarios may result in lower BER.
Let us now consider the same intercept-resend attack
for quantum encoder with entanglement. Evan, while
posing as Bob, will insert a Hadamard gate before he
measures in the computational basis. In doing so, he
will project the qubit into |1〉 or |0〉, thus disentangling
it from the other qubit. When Bob performs his mea-
surement after inserting a Hadamrad gate, he will get a
completely random outcome, therefore the bit error rate
will be as high as 50%. While Evan acquires most or all
of the transmitted bits after the public exchange between
Alice and Bob with these two encoders, the high bit er-
ror rate, especially with using entangled qubits, increases
the probability of detecting the eavesdropper before send-
ing the key and thus prevents Evan from deciphering the
original message.
In conclusion, it was shown that by combining the
methods of classical cryptography and quantum encryp-
tion we can find new protocols for deterministic secure
quantum communication that encodes both the key and
the message with the same quantum algorithm and can
detect an eavesdropper with a high probability. Conven-
tional methods of DSQC do not require sharing a private
key between Alice and Bob. In our case, we use a special
key to encrypt each packet and send it on the quantum
channel. While for the quantum one-time pad proto-
col [7] a security check is performed before the message
is sent, here, we perform the check concurrently while
sending an encrypted message. The proposed scheme
does not require a two-way quantum channel and thus
demands less stringent requirements on the photon stor-
age than other schemes which require two-way quantum
channels. A full security proof and an analysis of more
complex attack strategies are required to ensure the se-
curity of this protocol.
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5FIG. 1. The preprocessing block diagram of a classical message before it is fed into a quantum encoder. A hash value
(checksum) is added to the message before it is being encrypted with a random key. Random redundancy check bits are
inserted into the the encrypted message at random locations.
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FIG. 2. (a, b) The circuit diagram of the quantum encoder and decoder for the DSQC protocol that does not use entanglement.
Every bit is encoded by two qubits. One random qubit is encoded in the computational basis {|0〉, |1〉} and the other one in
the Hadamard basis { 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉)}. The receiver, on the other hand, measures the two qubits in either the computational
basis or the Hadamrad basis in a random manner. The random choices are determined by a random number generator (RNG)
(c, d) The circuit diagram of the quantum encoder and decoder for the DSQC protocol that uses entangled qubits. ‘1’ and ‘0’
are encoded by two qubits in the states 1
2
(|00〉 − |01〉 − |10〉 − |11〉) and 1
2
(|00〉 − |01〉+ |10〉+ |11〉) respectively. The first qubit
is measured by the sender, while the second one is measured by the receiver in the Hadamard basis.
